PresentationsResearchers and collaborators on this project present their research in the videos posted below.
Catch Shares and Regulatory Capture Over Fisheries
Dr. Christopher Costello, University of California Santa Barbara We examine whether adopting a catch share changes the incentives for the fishing industry to lobby for more conservative fish catches. First, we examine this issue theoretically and find that indeed, the adoption of catch shares changes incentives. In theory, this is because the catch share gives fishermen a long-term, secure right to harvest into the future. This security provides an incentive to place more emphasis on the future catches (and thus more conservative current management) than under a limited entry program. We test that theory with a global database of all fisheries with formal stock assessments. Consistent with the theory of "regulatory capture" from economics, we find that upon adopting catch shares, fisheries tend to be more conservatively managed. This effect is particularly strong for fisheries in need of rebuilding. TNC’s engagement in the groundfish fishery: Results of the California Risk Pool
Kate Labrum, The Nature Conservancy Over the course of the last several years The Nature Conservancy has sought to work collaboratively with the fishing industry and community leaders to use the best science and technology to test new harvest models while ensuring resource health. For the past four years TNC has collaborated with a dozen groundfish fishing boats to form the California Risk Pool, which is an agreement to pool overfished species quota and manage the risk of catching these constraining species to maximize conservation and economic opportunities while retaining local access to fish. The risk pool agreement requires adherence to spatial fishing plans and use of an electronic logbook system developed by TNC (eCatch). Since 2011, the risk pool has resulted in reduced bycatch of overfished species, increased harvests of target species, and tracking and sharing of spatial information using eCatch. Results from 2011-2013 will be presented, along with a short update on the status of a collaborative research project assessing the role of the Rockfish Conservation Area in rebuilding overfished species in central California. Incentivizing selectivity in the West Coast Groundfish Fishery
Peter Kuriyama, University of Washington Fisheries managers are charged with achieving biological and economic sustainability. For complex multispecies fisheries, these two goals are difficult to achieve. In recent years, catch shares have been increasingly implemented to ensure biological and economic sustainability. Under catch shares, individual fishers are allocated catch quotas for each species, and challenged to catch their quotas of valuable target species while avoiding overfished species with low quotas. If fishers exceed their quota for any species, they must cease fishing until additional quota can be leased from others. As a result, fishers have incentives to minimize bycatch of non-target species by switching gear types and by fishing in different areas. The US West Coast Groundfish Fishery transitioned to catch shares in 2011. Quotas for overfished species are extremely low. For example, 93% of fishers are allocated 10 or fewer individual yelloweye rockfish in one year. Currently, there is no overfishing on the 26 managed species, but catches are far short of allowable quotas, except for three species. Additionally, discard rates have declined from 45% to 10% (2002-2012). Thus in the US West Coast, catch shares achieve biological sustainability perhaps at the expense of economic sustainability. Fishermen Profits in Mixed-Stock Fisheries Management
Dr. Jono Wilson, The Nature Conservancy In this project we examine the role of no-take reserves in managing multi-species complexes under ITQ management. We use simulation modeling to determine the costs and benefits of using no-take reserves as a management tool for meeting fishery objectives in a mixed-stock, ITQ management system with hard bycatch caps and 100% observer coverage. Individual and Collective Adaptations to Bycatch IFQs
Dr. Robert Deacon, University of California Santa Barbara Data from logbooks and other information sources indicates that fishing methods changed following the introduction of ITQs for bycatch (and target) species and we interpret these changes as causal. Some of the shifts were subtle, but all are statistically discernable in the data. We report shifts in set times and tow duration for trawl tows following ITQ implementation. We also report shifts in the type of gear used by harvesters. While causation is invariably difficult to identify, we employ statistical methods that control for other potential causal factors in order to isolate the ITQ implementation effect. Moreover, the nature of the resource and the harvest methods used to harvest it make our causal interpretation all the more plausible. We also report summary evidence on an important collective action taken by fishers in response to bycatch ITQs, the creation and operation of ‘risk pools’. We conclude that these nuanced responses, taken voluntarily in response to bycatch ITQs, would be difficult or impossible to achieve with prescriptive regulation. Harvesters’ responses to bycatch IFQs: Spatial adjustments
Steve Miller, University of California Santa Barbara The introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) for bycatch species in 2011 forced fishers to pay for each pound of fish they caught. One way fishers can avoid such costs is by moving to areas where bycatch is less likely to be encountered. Using trawl logbooks and other data, we examine the extent to which such spatial reallocation of effort occurred as a means to reduce bycatch incidence. In particular, we use a combination of location and economic data to estimate fishers’ marginal willingness to pay to avoid a pound of bycatch. The resulting implied prices reveal both the costs of conservation and an important contrast with explicit spatial management. Under ITQs, we find that fishers avoid areas around Rockfish Conservation Areas rather than ‘fishing the line’ as might be expected under spatial management alone. How do populations respond to fishing? A spatio-temporal investigation of population seasonal dynamics
Kotaro Ono, University of Washington Species distribution modeling (SDM) is an important statistical tool for obtaining ecological insight into species-habitat relationships, and providing advice for natural resource management. In this study, we used three large spatio-temporal data sources (habitat maps, survey-based fish density estimates and fishery catch data) and a novel spatio-temporal model to study how the distribution of fishing effort may affect the seasonal dynamics of a commercially important fish species (Pacific Dover sole, Microstomus pacificus) commonly found off the US West coast. Dover sole seasonal dynamics were primarily driven by movement and the effect of fishing was small. They showed a large scale change in seasonal and annual distribution but also displayed a consistent seasonal flux of biomass across years. They appeared to move inshore or to deeper waters during late summer/early fall, leaving the mid-depth zones. They also consistently congregated or left some areas along the coast during the same time period. Additionally, results suggest that the population might be moving outside the range of the survey area during the survey season. The availability of appropriate data and spatio-temporal modeling software should facilitate extending this work to many other species – particularly those in marine ecosystems – and identifying the role of growth, recruitment, movement and fishing on spatial patterns of species distribution in marine systems. Catch-shares: expectations from other fisheries
Dr. Trevor A. Branch, University of Washington |
Online DiscussionIf you would like to engage in a discussion about this project, please write your questions and comments below. They will be addressed during the live chat on July 30th from 4-6 pm PST.
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